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I
INTRODUCTION
1

2

For better or worse, my approach to Twombly and Iqbal has been one of
accommodation rather than battle, seeking, in the common law tradition, to
assimilate these decisions into the body of law of which they are a part. I have
3
suggested strategies for lawyers to use in response to these decisions. I have
also proposed a Rule amendment that I believe meets the primary concerns of
4
both the plaintiff and defense bar. For these efforts, I have been called an
5
optimist —a charge to which I plead guilty.
6
I see little hope of these decisions being overruled. Unlike some areas,
including federalism, the First Amendment, and substantive due process, where
justices have adhered to their dissenting views and refused to accept their losses
7
as binding precedent, no one on the Supreme Court seems inclined to refight
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1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 555 U.S. 662 (2009).
3. See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010).
4. See Edward A. Hartnett, Responding to Twombly and Iqbal: Where Do We Go from Here?, 95
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 24 (2010).
5. See Kevin Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 821, 840 n.69 (2010).
6. Cf. Luke Meier, Why Twombly is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) and Iqbal Will Be
Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734791.
7. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163–64 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (adhering to his view that earlier decisions “misapprehended basic First
Amendment principles” and giving those decisions no precedential weight); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 431 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (adhering to her view regarding due
process limitations on punitive damages); Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 702 n.2 (2001)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting his adherence to his “previously stated views
on the proper scope of the Commerce Clause”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“I remain convinced that Union Gas was correctly decided and that the
decision of five Justices in Seminole Tribe to overrule that case was profoundly misguided. Despite my
respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent.”); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 800 n.33, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (adhering to the view that the
“Eleventh Amendment was never intended to bar federal-question suits against the States in federal
court” and describing the majority’s approach as “probably . . . fleeting”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy,
519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting his “continuing adherence to the view that the
so-called ‘negative’ Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond

HARTNETT

38

2/15/2012 4:55 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 75:37

Twombly and Iqbal. In the past term, both Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Sotomayor have authored opinions for the Court that rely on the Twombly and
8
Iqbal precedents. With these Justices accommodating themselves to Twombly
and Iqbal, overruling is nearly impossible to imagine. Nor have I seen anything
suggesting that a Rule amendment repudiating them outright would have any
traction, particularly with the Federal Judicial Center’s report to the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules unable to find any statistically
significant increase in the rate at which motions to dismiss for failure to state a
9
claim have been granted (except in cases challenging financial instruments).
10
And despite my friend Steve Burbank’s valiant efforts, I also think that the
prospect of Congressional repudiation died with the 111th Congress, especially
with the defeat of Senator Arlen Specter. As far as I can see, accommodation is
the only game in town.
My route to this accommodationist approach is worth explaining. My work
on this issue began with a presentation at the Thirty-Second Annual Judicial
its existing domain”).
8. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., for a
unanimous court) (holding that plaintiffs “have alleged facts plausibly suggesting that reasonable
investors would have viewed these particular reports as material”); Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289,
1296 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.) (stating that Rule 8(a)(2) “generally requires only a plausible ‘short and
plain’ statement of the plaintiff's claim”). It is true that Skinner does not cite Twombly and Iqbal, but it
does refer to the requirement of plausibility. And Matrixx prominently cites both decisions. 131 S. Ct.
at 1323.
9. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES (2011). The stability of a grant rate, of course, does not mean that Twombly and Iqbal are
having no significant effect, because lawyers take those decisions into account in making litigation
decisions and it may be that defense counsel are filing so many more motions to dismiss that they would
not have previously filed that the grant rate remains stable. The FJC study does show an increase in
filing motions, but cannot establish whether more cases are being dismissed because the data sets differ.
One study of Twombly takes into account that “in response to a legal change, plaintiffs and
defendants may change their legal strategy” so that “[t]he rate at which plaintiffs or defendants prevail
in litigation may not change, even after a sharp change in how courts decide cases.” William H.J.
Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly
(Univ. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 575, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstraact=1883831. Hubbard finds “fairly precise zeros for the effects of Twombly on
both the grant rate of motions to dismiss and the overall rate of dismissal among filed cases.” Id. at 31.
However, a forthcoming note that takes party selection into account suggests that Twombly and Iqbal
are having an effect on at least eighteen percent of cases. Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to
Discovery? Conceptual Challenges in and Empirical Results for Assessing the Effects of Twombly and
L.J.
(forthcoming),
available
at
Iqbal
on
Access
to
Discovery,
121
YALE
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957363.
My point is not that Twombly and Iqbal are having no effect, but rather that with substantial
empirical study suggesting less effect than critics predicted, the rulemakers are likely to be rather
hesitant to repudiate major Supreme Court decisions. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Draft
Minutes, Apr. 4–5, 2011, 22 (suggesting that the “Court would be receptive if the Committee could
show a major problem . . . . But that may not be likely[]”). Perhaps if Gelbach’s findings are replicated,
that may change.
10. See Hearing on Whether the Supreme Court has Limited Americans’ Access to Court Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 22 (2009) (Prepared Statement of Stephen B. Burbank, David
Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania) (arguing for passage of
an Act of Congress responding to Twombly and Iqbal).
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Conference of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in
March of 2008. An academic who treated that audience of district judges,
magistrate judges, and practicing lawyers to an argument that a Supreme Court
decision was wrong-headed and illegitimate would have been of scant assistance
to them. Of course, criticizing judicial decisions is one important role of legal
11
academics, and one in which I happily engage. But as I saw it, and continue to
see it, another role of legal academics is to help judges and lawyers understand
and deal with the legal doctrine that confronts them. For that reason, I am
12
proud rather than embarrassed to be a co-author of a leading practice treatise,
a genre of legal writing that is as accommodationist as one can imagine.
Moreover, there has been no shortage of legal academics heaping criticism
on the Court. There has been, however, a real shortage of scholarship that
might help lawyers and judges to avoid the injustices that those critics feared.
For similar reasons, I do not think that the audience at this conference,
consisting primarily of plaintiff’s lawyers, would find much value (apart perhaps
from the emotional inspiration akin to that from a campaign rally) in hearing
yet another critique of Twombly and Iqbal. Instead, I think the most useful
contribution I can make is to provide a bit of a status report on the how efforts
to tame Twombly and Iqbal are faring. My hope is to convince you both to try
my strategies and to support my proposal—or at least to tell me why not.
II
WHAT IS CONCLUSORY? WHAT IS PLAUSIBLE?
The basic framework for evaluating a complaint that emerges from these
decisions is as follows: A court distinguishes between factual allegations and
conclusory allegations. It assumes the truth of the factual allegations, but not
the conclusory allegations. Finally, it assesses, using common sense and judicial
13
experience, whether the claim is plausible.
Under this framework, the distinction between factual allegations and
conclusory allegations is crucial, for it marks the line between what will be
11. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Congress Clears Its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 553 (2005);
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643 (2000); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How
Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2239 (1999); Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON
HALL L. REV. 735 (2003). The last-listed of these articles contributed to a bit of a constitutional crisis in
New Jersey earlier this year. See Edward A. Hartnett, Seeking a Path to Restore Order in the New Jersey
Supreme Court, THE STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 15, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 24793041; Paul Mulshine,
In This Schoolyard Fight, Christie Could Have Fun During Recess, THE STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 14, 2010
available at 2010 WLNR 24780246.
12. EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (9th ed. 2007).
13. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.”).
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assumed to be true and what will not be assumed to be true. Some have argued
14
that the distinction is incoherent, and some fear an infinite regress: any
allegation can be considered “conclusory” in the sense that one can always ask
15
for the underlying information that supports an allegation. I have argued that
the label “conclusory,” in the context of Twombly and Iqbal, should be limited
to allegations that are essentially equivalent to the elements of a right of action.
So understood, the distinction is not incoherent, and it avoids the risk of an
16
infinite regress. Instead, it works to insist that a plaintiff, in the words of
Charles Clark, take “one step further back” from the “final and ultimate
17
conclusion which the court is to make in deciding the case for him.”
Some feared that the plausibility test would license judges to evaluate the
believability of any (or all) allegations in a complaint. I have argued instead that
the plausibility test can be understood as equivalent to the traditional insistence
18
that the inferences that a plaintiff asks a court to draw must be reasonable. So
understood, a court separates the factual allegations from the conclusions as to
each element of the right of action, assumes the former to be true, and then asks
whether the latter (the conclusions as to each element of the right of action) can
reasonably be inferred from the former (the factual allegations).
How are these arguments faring in the lower courts? Although I make no
19
claim to have read all of the thousands of cases that cite Twombly and Iqbal, I
have seen numerous cases that use the term “conclusory” to describe
allegations that are essentially equivalent to the elements of a right of action
and scant evidence in these courts of any move toward the feared infinite
20
regress. Professor Alex Reinert catalogues a number of cases that he views as
14. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 867 (2010).
15. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1318 (2010)
(explaining the “endless cascade of inquiry” that could result if “[e]ach allegation that might be offered
to ‘plausibly suggest’ some other allegation would itself require support, and so on and so on”).
16. See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 491–92.
17. Id. at 491 (quotations omitted) (citing Clark).
18. Id. at 484–85.
19. A Westlaw search for “Twombly /p Iqbal”—which is surely an underinclusive search—
returned 14,648 hits on July 29, 2011. A particularly valuable resource for anyone trying to keep track
of cases discussing and applying Twombly and Iqbal is the periodically revised memorandum by
Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, available on the United States Courts web page. See
Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules
Comm. & Standing Rules Comm. (Mar. 29, 2011) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_March_2011.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating an allegation
that was, in essence, that the supervisory defendants told other defendants to do what they did as a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a supervisory liability claim and hence conclusory); Hayden v.
Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 162 (2d Cir. 2010) (identifying as conclusory those allegations that are “in effect
and intent . . . the very assertion that plaintiffs must prove”); Pa. Prison Soc’y v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215,
233 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating an allegation that a state constitutional amendment “impose[d] additional
punishment” as conclusory) (internal quotations omitted); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618
F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an allegation of agreement); Brookhart v. Rohr, 385
F. App’x 67, 70 (3d Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an allegation of pattern of racketeering activity);
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reflecting confusion in the lower courts about what kinds of allegations are
21
properly labeled conclusory. I do not doubt that there is some confusion and
conflict. However, it is worth noting that the same allegation might properly be
considered conclusory in one case, and not in another, because the conclusory
nature of an allegation should not be judged in the abstract, but in the context
of a particular right of action. What is conclusory depends on the conclusions
that are necessary for relief under a particular right of action. I do not pretend
that this reconciles all the cases, but rather that it offers a path out of the
confusion and conflict.
Similarly, I see little evidence that the plausibility test is being used by
judges to evaluate the believability of any (or all) allegations in a complaint.
Overwhelmingly, courts recognize that the plausibility test is about the
reasonableness of inferences from factual allegations to conclusions, not about
Rhodes v. Prince, 360 F. App’x 555, 559 (5th Cir. 2010) (treating an allegation of arrest as conclusory
“[b]ecause an ‘arrest’ is a legal conclusion under the Fourth Amendment and a necessary element of a
false arrest claim”); In re NM Holdings Co., 622 F.3d 613, 623 (6th Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an
allegation that was at most a formulaic recitation of the causation element of a professional negligence
claim); Telesaurus VPC, L.L.C. v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an
allegation that the defendant was a common carrier); Mecca v. United States, 389 F. App’x 775, 780
(10th Cir. 2010) (treating as conclusory an allegation that defendants “agreed, by words or conduct, to
accomplish an unlawful goal or accomplish a goal through unlawful means”) (internal quotations
omitted); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2010) (treating as
conclusory an allegation that visco-elastic foam mattresses comprise a relevant product market);
Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctr. For Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d
1371, 1381 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the plaintiff “must do more than recite these statutory elements
in conclusory fashion”); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2010) (treating as
conclusory an allegation that plaintiff “was subjected to a hostile discriminatory environment on the
basis of his race”) (internal quotations omitted); Arar v. Ashcroft, 584 F.3d 559, 617 (2d Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (Parker, J., dissenting) (“Allegations are deemed ‘conclusory’ where they recite only the
elements of the claim.”); McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 577 F.3d 521, 532 (3d Cir. 2009) (treating as
conclusory allegations that a ramp was a public forum, that defendants inhibited plaintiffs from
exercising their religion, and that defendants’ actions constituted a substantial burden on plaintiffs’
religious exercise); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 259 (4th Cir.
2009) (referring to a “conclusory allegation of an element of the immunity claim”); Floyd v. City of
Kenner, La., 352 F. App’x 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2009) (treating as conclusory an allegation that defendant
participated in, approved, and directed the filing of false and misleading affidavits); Hensley Mfg. v.
ProPride, Inc. 579 F.3d 603, 611 (6th Cir. 2009) (treating as conclusory an allegation that defendant
created “a strong likelihood of confusion in the marketplace as to the source of origin and sponsorship
of the goods”) (internal quotations omitted); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 582 (7th Cir. 2009) (treating
as conclusory an allegation that defendant knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously prosecuted
plaintiff in retaliation for exercising his rights); McAdams v. McCord, 584 F.3d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir.
2009) (treating as conclusory an allegation that plaintiff’s loss was “a direct and proximate result of
Defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations and omission of material facts”) (internal quotations
omitted); Delta Mech., Inc., v. Garden City Grp., 345 F. App’x 232, 234–35 (9th Cir. 2009) (Ikuta, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (treating as conclusory an allegation that the plaintiff is an
intended third-party beneficiary); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009)
(treating as conclusory an allegation that paramilitary security forces acted under color of state law);
Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009) (“Allegations become ‘conclusory’ where
they recite only the elements of the claim . . . .”); cf. Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592,
595 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing an allegation as to state of mind as a factual allegation rather than an
“ultimate legal conclusion[]” but still treating it as conclusory).
21. Alex Reinert, Pleading As Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012 at 1,
10.
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22

the believability of factual allegations. There are occasional exceptions, where
judges find factual allegations so outlandish as to be beyond belief, but in doing
so, they rely on Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Iqbal, and its discussion of
23
time travel and little green men from Mars.
Ironically, the biggest threat I see to the prospect of confining the category
of conclusory allegations to those that are equivalent to the elements of the
24
right of action comes from Justice Sotomayor’s recent opinion in Matrixx. The
Matrixx case involved a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) and Rule
25
10b-5 against the manufacturer of an over-the-counter medication, Zicam. The
plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer’s failure to reveal reports that linked
Zicam to anosmia (the loss of smell) was a material omission. The Court
observed that one element of such a claim was “a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant” and that materiality is satisfied when there is “a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of
26
information made available.” It held that the complaint should not have been
dismissed because the plaintiffs “alleged facts plausibly suggesting that
27
reasonable investors would have viewed these particular reports as material.”
So far, so good. Although the complaint included an allegation that
“defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of
Matrixx common stock, by publicly issuing false and misleading statements and
omitting to disclose material adverse facts regarding Zicam, necessary to make
28
defendants’ statements, as set forth herein not false and misleading,” the Court
did not simply assume that allegation to be true. If it had, the opinion could
have been quite short, simply announcing that, assuming that this allegation
were true, the omissions were material. Instead, without specifically adverting
to this allegation—and not including it in the recitation of the “facts . . . which
29
the courts below properly assumed to be true” —it treated this allegation as
conclusory and asked whether the factual allegations plausibly supported this
conclusion of materiality. Once it concluded that the factual allegations
plausibly supported the conclusion of materiality, it held that the complaint

22. See, e.g., Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1386 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff “need not prove
his case on the pleadings,” but “merely provide enough factual material to raise a reasonable inference,
and thus a plausible claim” that the defendant was the source of the disclosures at issue).
23. See Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009–10 (D.C. Cir. 2009); cf. Atkins v. City of
Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 830–32 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding some factual allegations unrealistic or
nonsensical, others contradictory, and others “not impossible” but “highly implausible,” and concluding
that a district court “has to consider all these features of a complaint en route to deciding whether the
complaint has enough substance to warrant putting the defendant to the expense of discovery”).
24. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2011).
26. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1317–18 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
27. Id. at 1314.
28. Consolidated Amended Complaint at ¶ 59, Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d
1167 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-15677).
29. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1314.
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adequately alleged materiality.
However, the opinion also addresses the plausibility of a causal link between
Zicam and anosmia. It cites Twombly and Iqbal immediately before stating,
“The information provided to Matrixx by medical experts revealed a plausible
30
causal relationship between Zicam Cold Remedy and anosmia.” Moreover, it
cites Twombly (and recites its plausibility standard) before stating that
plaintiffs’ “allegations plausibly suggest that [two medical professionals’]
conclusions were based on reliable evidence of a causal link between Zicam and
31
anosmia.” In addition, it notes that the complaint alleges that studies
confirmed the toxicity of zinc (one of the ingredients in Zicam) and that “the
existence of the studies suggests a plausible biological link between zinc and
32
anosmia.”
Of course, in a tort action against the manufacturer by someone who lost his
sense of smell, such causation would be an element of the right of action. But in
a 10b-5 case, that causation is not an element, and addressing the plausibility of
that causal link suggests that the Court might be applying the plausibility
requirement more broadly to other allegations of a complaint.
A more limited reading is nonetheless possible, and preferable: If an
element of a right of action depends on a chain of inferences, then in order for
the ultimate conclusion regarding that element to be plausible, each link in the
chain of inference must be plausible. In Matrixx, the chain of inferences
regarding materiality was something like this:
Medical experts suspect that there is a causal link between Zicam and anosmia.

Consumers, regulators, and doctors would be concerned about the suspected causal
link between Zicam and anosmia, thereby hurting sales.

Reasonable investors would think that the suspected causal link between Zicam and
anosmia is important.

Viewed this way, the discussion of the plausibility of a causal link in Matrixx
is included only to evaluate the plausibility of the ultimate inference that
reasonable investors would think the claimed causal link to be important. If the
claimed causal link were itself implausible (the Court seems to assume), then
consumers, regulators, and doctors would not be concerned, and neither would
reasonable investors.
Matrixx is helpful in one regard: It seems to make clear that the
determination of plausibility is to be made on an element-by-element basis.
Twombly and Iqbal referred to the plausibility of the claim, but in each case,
only one element was at issue; upon finding one element implausible, the claim
30. Id. at 1323; see also id. at 1322 (“Assuming the complaint’s allegations to be true, as we must,
Matrixx received information that plausibly indicated a reliable causal link between Zicam and
anosmia.”).
31. Id. at 1322 n.12.
32. Id. at n.13.
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failed. Matrixx involved two elements, materiality and scienter, and the Court
evaluated them separately, determining the sufficiency of the element of
materiality under the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal, and the
sufficiency of the element of scienter under the standard set by the Private
33
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Significantly, after determining
that the allegations regarding each element were sufficient, it did not evaluate
the plausibility of the 10b-5 claim taken as a whole, but simply concluded that
the court of appeals was correct that the complaint should not have been
dismissed. This is significant, not only as a clarification of the approach lower
courts should take, but also because the alternative of evaluating the plausibility
of the claim as a whole could lead to the dismissal of more complaints if courts
34
adopted a version of the product rule. If a court were to evaluate the
plausibility of the claim as a whole, it might determine that each of (say) six
elements was itself plausible, but that the simultaneous combination of all six
elements was not plausible—just as the likelihood of any particular child being
1
1
1
1
a girl is /2, while the likelihood of having a family of six girls is /64 ( /2 times /2
1
1
1
1
times /2 times /2 times /2 times /2).
Some contend that assessing plausibility inherently involves a comparative
35
analysis of competing inferences. This is certainly true for scienter under the
PSLRA, which requires that the inference of scienter be “at least as compelling
36
as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” It may well
be true at trial, when one is choosing the best inference, and typically true at
37
other stages of litigation when adversaries are offering competing inferences.
I am not fully convinced that determining plausibility is necessarily
comparative. It seems to me that if an inference is sufficiently in accord with
common experience, it might well be judged plausible even without comparing
it to other conceivable inferences. Likewise, if an inference is sufficiently out of
whack with common experience—such as inferring from the fact that I am
Derek Jeter’s second cousin once removed to the conclusion that I am a star
Major League Baseball player—it can be rejected as implausible without
comparing it to other conceivable inferences. (Perhaps some would say that the
comparison is implicit and unarticulated.) Nevertheless, in deciding whether a
suggested inference is plausible, it is certainly commonplace to consider
33. Id. at 1317–25 (discussing the element of materiality in Part IIA of the opinion and the element
of scienter in Part IIB of the opinion).
34. See generally David McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical
Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 741 (1990)
(explaining the product rule). Another reason to decline to take this route is that courts would face the
difficult if not insurmountable problem of determining the extent to which the individual elements are
independent of each other.
35. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93
JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009) (“Judgments about the plausibility of a complaint are necessarily
comparative.”).
36. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
37. See United States v. Beard, 354 F.3d 691, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2004); Ronald J. Allen, Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 611 (1994).
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alternative inferences.
Consider a complaint involving a traffic accident on I-95:
Plaintiff was driving southbound on I-95 in Florida on March 26, 2011.
A car in front of plaintiff’s car stopped short.
Plaintiff was able to stop her car in time to avoid hitting the car in front of her.
Defendant was driving a car behind the plaintiff and did not stop until colliding with
plaintiff’s car.
In failing to stop before colliding with the plaintiff’s car, the defendant purposefully
38
and intentionally assaulted the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.

I expect that you found the conclusion of purposeful assault based on sexual
orientation rather jarring. Rule 8(b) permits an allegation of state of mind to be
made generally, but Iqbal refuses to require that courts credit such an allegation
39
and insists that it plausibly follow from the other allegations in the complaint.
The point is not that no one who crashed a car into someone else ever did so
because of the victim’s sexual orientation and that courts should assume that no
one ever will. Even highly unusual things happen sometimes. Instead, the point
is that if a plaintiff alleges that this is what actually happened to him, the
plaintiff must provide some allegation—other than just a general allegation
regarding the defendant’s state of mind—plausibly suggesting that it did.
In the absence of any other information, is purposeful assault based on
sexual orientation a plausible inference? Not compared to the inference of
insufficient attention, inadequate car maintenance, or too-slow reflexes, or even
an accident that the defendant simply could not avoid. In rejecting the
plausibility (in the absence of other information) of a purposeful assault based
on sexual orientation, it would be natural to describe the competing inferences
as more likely. And in expressing their rejection of the plausibility of the
inferences that the plaintiffs sought to draw in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court
40
similarly referred to other inferences as more likely.
But that should not be read to mean that the only inference that is plausible
is the one that is more likely than any other—for that would be to try the case
on the complaint. Moreover, Iqbal insists that the “plausibility standard is not

38. See Brofman v. Fla. Hearing Care Ctr. Inc., 703 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(involving a civil suit under the Florida hate crimes statutes, FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (2010)).
39. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009) (“Respondent finally maintains that the Federal
Rules expressly allow him to allege petitioners’ discriminatory intent ‘generally,’ which he equates with
a conclusory allegation. It follows, respondent says, that his complaint is sufficiently well pleaded
because it claims that petitioners discriminated against him ‘on account of [his] religion, race, and/or
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’ Were we required to accept this allegation as
true, respondent’s complaint would survive petitioners’ motion to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context . . . .
Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label
‘general allegation,’ and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”) (alteration in original)
(internal citations omitted).
40. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007) (“obvious alternative explanation”);
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“more likely explanations”).
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akin to ‘a probability requirement,’” so it would be wrong to read Iqbal to
require that the plaintiff’s proposed inference be more likely than competing
42
inferences. Instead, these passages in Twombly and Iqbal should be
understood simply to reflect that part of what can make an inference
implausible is the existence of significantly better competing inferences.
III
SUGGESTIONS FOR DRAFTING AND DEFENDING COMPLAINTS
In light of all this, how should a plaintiff go about drafting a complaint? It
might be thought that a plaintiff should simply avoid conclusory allegations. I
do not think so, for as Justice Kennedy explained in Iqbal, conclusory
43
allegations can provide the framework for a complaint. They provide a
framework by establishing what—at least as the plaintiff understands the
substantive law—the elements of the right of action sued upon by the plaintiff
are. I understand that it is frequently said that a complaint under the Federal
Rules need not state all of the elements of a right of action. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the court in Skinner, noted that “under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a
44
precise legal theory.” The opinion in Matrixx, on the other hand, lists the five
elements of a 10b-5 action and then evaluates whether the plaintiffs “have failed
to plead both the element of a material misrepresentation or omission and the
45
element of scienter,” evidently taking for granted that such elements had to be
pleaded.
Even if the complaint itself need not reveal a legal theory, in order to
46
survive a 12(b)(6) motion, counsel must provide one. And in Skinner, Justice
41. 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
42. See Fabian v. Fulmer Helmets, Inc., 628 F.3d 278, 281 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that because
conflicting inferences were both plausible, dismissal was inappropriate); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614
F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (“For cases governed only by Rule 8, it is not necessary to stack up the
inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the plaintiff’s inferences seem more
compelling than the opposing inferences.”); Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2010) ( “[The
Plaintiff’s] complaint raised plausible inferences of both employee and independent contractor status.
Which inference will prove to be correct is not an issue to be determined by a motion to dismiss.”);
Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prod., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding the allegation of
settlement agreement plausible based on the attachment of an unsigned settlement proposal as an
exhibit to the complaint); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 617 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Parker, J.,
dissenting) (“[Allegations] become implausible when the court’s commonsense credits far more likely
inferences from the available facts”); W. Pa. Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. U.P.M.C., 627 F.3d 85, 98
(3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting idea that “Twombly’s plausibility standard functions more like a probability
requirement in complex cases”); Escuadra v. Geovera Specialty Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (E.D.
Texas 2010) (“Requiring a plaintiff’s theory to be more plausible than alternatives would mean that
Rule 8’s pleading standard is more demanding than the PSLRA. It also would disregard both Twombly
and Iqbal which made clear that Rule 8 does not establish a probability requirement.”).
43. 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
44. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011).
45. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011).
46. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that
“plaintiffs . . . don't have to plead legal theories,” but that if “defendants filed a motion to dismiss . . . it
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Ginsburg added that the complaint in that case was “not a model of the careful
47
drafter’s art.” For that reason, I believe that it is the general practice of the
bar, or at least those members of the bar who strive to practice the careful
drafter’s art, to reveal a legal theory by including allegations of each element of
a right of action in the complaint. And I suggest that the wisdom of doing so is
underscored by Twombly, Iqbal, and now Matrixx.
By including such allegations, a plaintiff not only makes clear his
understanding of the legal theory or theories upon which the complaint relies
(both to the reader and to himself) but can also point to them as the conclusory
allegations not entitled to a presumption of truth, and distinguish them from the
factual allegations that are entitled to the presumption of truth.
The plaintiff must also, however, be sure to include factual allegations from
which the conclusory allegations regarding each element of the right of action
can reasonably be inferred. I would suggest that a well-crafted complaint should
make clear, at least through its structure, which allegations are intended to be
factual allegations entitled to the presumption of truth, and which are intended
to be elements of the right of action that can reasonably be inferred from those
48
factual allegations. Indeed, it may be useful, in a post-Twombly and Iqbal
world, to structure a complaint to make clear which factual allegations support
which conclusions.
Some think that the demand for plausibility is a demand for factual
specificity. To my mind, there is a no necessary connection between specificity
and plausibility. Consider again the hypothetical complaint involving a traffic
accident on I-95 and alleging purposeful assault because of the victim’s sexual
orientation. Providing lots of specifics about the accident (time of day, precise
location, speed of the cars, weather, even the VINs for each car) would do
nothing to add to the plausibility of purposeful assault based on sexual
orientation discrimination. Even specifics about the state of mind—were that
possible—would do little to make the conclusion plausible. Rule 8(b) permits
an allegation of state of mind to be made generally. Iqbal does not ask for more
details about the state of mind; it asks for reasons to believe that state of mind
existed. A demand for specificity asks, “Can you tell me about that in more
detail?” A demand for plausibility asks, “Why should I think that?”
Some have worried that Iqbal, by instructing judges to determine
plausibility based on common sense and judicial experience, invited

would not be responsive of the plaintiff to say that she was not ‘required at this stage of the litigation to
specifically characterize or identify the legal basis of the claims in the complaint[]’”).
47. 131 S. Ct. at 1296.
48. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring a court to “find the facts specially and state its
conclusions of law separately”). If the plaintiff has “personal knowledge of an element of a claim that
he alleges . . . . it is simplest to view such an allegation as not conclusory—because it is not expressing
an inference at all. Alternatively, one could view it as conclusory and ask whether it is plausible to infer
that the conclusion is true, given that a person with personal knowledge says that it is true, but (without
making a forbidden credibility determination) the answer to that inquiry will always be yes.” Hartnett,
supra note 3, at 494 n.104.
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idiosyncratic and subjective decisionmaking. I, on the other hand, have argued
that the reference to common sense and judicial experience should be
49
understood as a description of the ordinary operation of inductive reasoning.
It seems to me that judges view themselves as applying ordinary inductive
reasoning, rather than being authorized to act on idiosyncratic and subjective
understandings. I admit, though, that here it is hard to be confident that the fear
is misplaced, because ordinary inductive reasoning is rooted in baseline
assumptions about the way the world usually works, and although such baseline
assumptions are shaped by one’s own experience, it is their nature to be
perceived as widely accepted common sense. Accordingly, even if a judge’s
baseline assumptions are not widely accepted common sense, a judge is likely to
think them so.
In recognition of the truth that inductive reasoning—and therefore the
plausibility test—depends on baseline assumptions about the way the world
usually works, I have suggested that lawyers, if they believe that a judge’s own
knowledge and experience would likely have led him to inaccurate baseline
assumptions about the way the world usually works, present information
designed to dislodge those inaccurate baseline assumptions. I confess that I do
not see much evidence that lawyers have attempted to do so. It might be that I
do not see such evidence because, if successfully deployed, judges will write as if
they understood the truth all along, rather than explain that they were blind,
but now they see. So it may be that lawyers are doing so all the time, but in a
50
way that is largely invisible to those who read judicial opinions.
It is also possible that lawyers are rarely trying to do so. If this is what is
happening, I would reiterate my suggestion: If you believe that a judge’s own
knowledge and experience would likely have led him to inaccurate baseline
assumptions about the way the world usually works, present information
51
designed to dislodge those inaccurate baseline assumptions.
Some of you may be thinking that none of these suggestions meet the most
frequent problem you have dealing with Twombly and Iqbal: the inability to
plead factual allegations from which one can plausibly infer an element because
you need discovery in order to make such factual allegations. Here, I have made
two related suggestions, one of which has gotten some support on the bench,
the other that seems not to have penetrated the bar at all.
The suggestion that has gotten some support on the bench is that discovery
can proceed despite the pendency of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). I
52
believe that argument is unassailable under the Federal Rules. Under Rule
49. Hartnett, supra note 3 at 498.
50. Some of the amicus briefs in Matrixx may have taught members of the Court how medical
experts treat inferences of causation. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1319–20 (citing amicus briefs in
discussion of medical professionals relying on evidence of causation that is not statistically significant).
51. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145, 184
n.192 (suggesting that advocates “might benefit from understanding the hidden factual assumptions at
issue in various doctrines and might resurrect the idea of the ‘Brandeis brief[]’”).
52. But see New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011)
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26(d), discovery may commence as soon as the discovery planning conference
pursuant to Rule 26(f) has been held. In contrast to the PSLRA, there is no
provision in the Federal Rules that automatically stays discovery upon the filing
of a motion to dismiss. Indeed, a court is specifically authorized by Rule 12(i) to
defer ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion until trial; thus a defendant who wishes such a
53
stay of discovery must move for a stay and show good cause under Rule 26.
Judge Posner has explicitly relied on my argument, explaining that “[i]f the
plaintiff shows that he can’t conduct an even minimally adequate investigation
without limited discovery, the judge can presumably allow that discovery,
54
meanwhile deferring ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss.” It is true
that Judge Posner was writing in dissent, but he was dissenting from an opinion
that reversed a 12(b)(6) dismissal and interpreted Twombly and Iqbal in a
remarkably pro-plaintiff way, reading the plausibility test to require nothing
more than “a story that holds together,” with the court asking itself, “could
55
these things have happened[?]” The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has also noted, while praising the district court’s management of the case, that
56
discovery continued during the pendency of a 12(b)(6) motion.
Even when defendants move to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss,
57
some post-Iqbal district courts deny the motion. Significantly, in doing so,
(“The plaintiff apparently can no longer obtain the factual detail necessary because the language of
Iqbal specifically directs that no discovery may be conducted in cases such as this, even when the
information needed to establish a claim . . . is solely within the purview of the defendant . . . .”).
53. See Hartnett, supra note 3, at 507–08; see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy
Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights
Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 123–24 (2010) (discussing the notion of “plausibility discovery”
within the framework of Rule 26); cf. David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 141–
43 (2010) (suggesting that the best way to “reconcile the Court’s decisions with the Rules is to read
Iqbal and Twombly to implicitly recalibrate the showing of good cause Rule 26(c) requires to stay
discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss,” but that, even understood this way, Iqbal did not
cut off all pre-motion-to-dismiss discovery).
54. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 404.
56. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Significantly, the
District Court allowed discovery to proceed while the motions to dismiss were pending. Plaintiffs’
amended pleadings were thus able to draw on documents produced and depositions taken . . . . The
District Court skillfully managed the consolidated proceedings.”); cf. Mann v. Brenner, 375 F. App’x
232, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court’s decision to stay discovery).
See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Levy, No. CV-10-1652(FB)(VVP), 2011 WL 288511, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
27, 2011) (“The pendency of the motion to dismiss does not provide an automatic basis to stay
discovery.”); Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes, Nov. 15–16, 2010, 24–25 (lawyers reporting
conflicting experience with stays being granted and a judge stating, “I don’t stay discovery.”) (internal
quotations omitted); Reinert, supra note 21, at 20 (“The Fifth Circuit, like many other circuits, also has
held that limited discovery may be appropriate where the plaintiff suffers from informational
asymmetry with respect to essential elements of his claim.”).
57. See, e.g., Baltayan v. Tito, No. 3:10-CV-1327(CFD), 2011 WL 1194305, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar.
30, 2011) (noting that the court had already ordered that discovery was not stayed pending decision on
a motion to dismiss); Lopez v. Sanders, No. 2:10-cv-76-DPM, 2011 WL 2679603, at *2 (E.D. Ark. July 8,
2011) (agreeing that “the allegations are too thin” under Iqbal, but allowing time “to do some basic
discovery” about the involvement of each defendant because “the undisputed fact remains that LopezAlvarado was beaten to death at the prison while some officers were on duty”).
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some courts emphasize the likelihood that even if the motion to dismiss were to
be granted, leave to amend would likely also be granted, and discovery would
58
be useful in drafting that amended complaint. One court has emphasized the
particular importance after Twombly of avoiding an “overly lenient standard
59
for granting motions to stay all discovery.”
The suggestion that seems to have gotten little traction among the bar is to
abandon pleading on information and belief. The practice is a remnant from
code pleading, particularly code pleading’s frequent commitment to verified
pleadings. In a pleading regime marked by verified pleadings, pleading on
information and belief was used to allow pleaders to allege matters that they
could not verify. But the Federal Rules do not require verification. Today, while
60
courts have found them permissible, an allegation made on information and
belief runs the risk of being treated as a conclusory allegation, not entitled to
the presumption of truth.
If counsel’s pre-filing inquiry reveals an evidentiary basis for a factual
allegation, then simply make the factual allegation. Do not dilute the force of
the allegation with references to information and belief. But what if your prefiling inquiry fails to reveal an evidentiary basis for a factual allegation, yet you
think that discovery will reveal such an evidentiary basis? Then do what Rule
11(b)(3) explicitly instructs: Specifically identify the allegation as a factual
contention that “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for . . . discovery.”
The two suggestions are related: By explicitly identifying particular factual
allegations pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3), the attention of counsel and the court can
be focused on the need for—and propriety of—discovery as to that factual
allegation. Rather than arguing in the abstract about the appropriateness of
discovery pending a 12(b)(6) motion, counsel and the court can focus more
precisely on a narrower question: whether to allow discovery to enable the
plaintiff to obtain evidence to support particular factual allegations that have
been specifically identified, in the manner explicitly provided for by the Federal
Rules, as needing discovery. Moreover, the terms of the debate about that
question will be shaped by terms of Rule 11(b)(3) itself: Can it reasonably be
expected that discovery will produce evidence to support that allegation?
58. S.F. Tech. v. Kraco Enter., L.L.C., No. 5:11-cv-00355 EJD, 2011 WL 2193397, at *2–*3 (N.D.
Cal. June 6, 2011) (noting that the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for automatic or
blanket stays of discovery” and that “district courts tend to look unfavorably” upon them, and
particularly emphasizing that “discovery would not be wasted” even if the motion to dismiss were
granted because the plaintiff “could utilize the discovery responses to prepare an amended pleading”);
Cloverleaf Golf Course, Inc. v. FMC Corp., No. 11-cv-190-DRH, 2011 WL 2838178, at *4 (S.D. Ill. July
15, 2011) (refusing to stay discovery because the defendant had not met its burden to justify a stay, and
noting that the court could not presume that the motion to dismiss would be granted and that even if it
were granted, plaintiff would likely have an opportunity to amend).
59. Trzaska v. Int’l Game Tech., No. 2:10-cv-02268-JCM-GWF, 2011 WL 1233298, at *4 (D. Nev.
Mar. 29, 2011).
60. See Arista Records L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); Boy Blue, Inc. v. Zomba
Recording, L.L.C., No. 3:09-CV-483-HEH, 2009 WL 2970794, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2009).
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Perhaps such an inquiry might seem odd and difficult. But I would hope not.
I would hope that it is similar to the thought process counsel engages in before
deciding to take a case: “What makes me think, if I don’t already have it, that
I’ll be able to get the evidence to prove all of the elements of the case?” Your
reasons for so believing—your reasons for taking the case in the first place—can
then be offered to the court as the reasons why the complaint should not be
61
dismissed without allowing discovery as to those particular allegations.
IV
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
I believe that all of these methods of dealing with Twombly and Iqbal are
permitted under the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet I also readily
admit that these suggestions are not complete solutions, in part because the
Rules do not make clear how a judge is supposed to handle an allegation
specifically identified pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3). A judge might exercise his
discretion to simply stay discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss
without grappling with the likelihood of obtaining discovery to support such an
allegation. And given the skepticism with which Twombly and Iqbal treat
careful case management, this might be the path of least resistance for some
62
judges.
Accordingly, I have also suggested an amendment to Rule 12(b) that, I
believe, reasonably accommodates the competing interests of plaintiffs who
need discovery to support their case and defendants who fear massive discovery
costs despite a meritless claim. As an accommodation of the competing interests
that assumes the continued viability of Twombly and Iqbal, I believe that it also
has a better chance of being adopted than proposals that seek to repudiate
those decisions. If I am right that it reasonably accommodates the competing
interests, please support the proposal. If it does not, please tell me.
I propose adding a new subsection to the end of Rule 12:
Rule 12(j): Allegations Likely To Have Evidentiary Support After a Reasonable
Opportunity for Discovery
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) that has not been deferred until trial, the
claim sought to be dismissed includes an allegation specifically identified as provided
in Rule 11(b)(3) as likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for discovery, the court must either (1) assume the truth of the allegation, or (2)
decide whether the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for discovery. In deciding whether an allegation is likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery, the court must

61. Cf. Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F. App’x 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that
the complaint conclusorily alleged that plaintiff was fired based on his national origin but never
intimated in any way why the plaintiff believed that national origin motivated the firing).
62. District courts in the Sixth Circuit might no longer see themselves as having any discretion in
the matter. See New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The
plaintiff apparently can no longer obtain the factual detail necessary because the language of Iqbal
specifically directs that no discovery may be conducted in cases such as this, even when the information
needed to establish a claim . . . is solely within the purview of the defendant . . . .”).
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consider the parties’ access to evidence in the absence of discovery and state on the
record the reason for its decision.
If the court decides that the allegation is likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for discovery, it must allow for that discovery, under the
standards of Rule 26, and deny the motion to dismiss. If the court decides that the
allegation is not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery, the court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule
56, and provide all parties a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.

I believe that this proposal accommodates the interests of plaintiffs who lack
evidentiary support for a particular allegation, by protecting them from their
worst fear under Twombly and Iqbal: having their claims dismissed because any
possible supportive evidence is in the hands of the defendant, without a court
ever directly confronting the question of whether they would likely be able to
get such supportive evidence if given the opportunity for discovery. If the court
assumes the truth of the allegation and nonetheless dismisses, it will not be
because of the inability to access supporting evidence. If the court does not
assume the truth of the allegation, it must decide whether the allegation is likely
to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery and, if
so, allow appropriate discovery. And in making this determination, the proposal
specifically directs judges to consider the parties’ access to evidence in the
absence of discovery.
It accommodates the interests of defendants by providing a means of getting
reasonably prompt judicial attention to the question of whether the defendant
can avoid the costs of discovery, either because the plaintiff loses even if
discovery turns up what he seeks or because there is no reason to think that
discovery will turn up what he seeks.
And it gives both plaintiffs and defendants an incentive to focus their
attention (and the court’s) on what are likely to be the determinative issue or
issues in the case. Those allegations identified under Rule 11(b)(3) are more
likely than other issues to be determinative, or at least more likely to be
determinative in the pretrial context. This can, I believe, promote the court’s
(and the public’s) interest in efficiency.
The proposal is designed to protect plaintiffs who think they already have
evidentiary support for a particular allegation, but realize that a judge might
disagree. If identifying an allegation under Rule 11(b)(3) meant that a judge
would simply disregard the allegation in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion when the
judge thought that discovery would not likely lead to supporting evidence,
plaintiffs might be rather wary of making such identifications. Under this
proposal, if the judge refuses to allow discovery, the result is not that the
allegation is disregarded; instead, plaintiffs have an opportunity to present the
evidence they do have, in an effort to convince the court that there is a triable
issue even without discovery on that point. Thus, plaintiffs would have an
incentive to properly identify such allegations, because they would get the
protection of the new provision. They have a countervailing incentive, however,
to not identify too many of their allegations this way, for that would likely make
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a judge rather skeptical.
Identifying an allegation as one made pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3) provides
the pleader with a crucial advantage under my proposal: It requires the court
either to assume that the allegation is true or to decide whether it is likely to
have evidentiary support after an opportunity for discovery. A court cannot, as
it might today and as happened in both Twombly and Iqbal, simply refuse to
credit an allegation made on information and belief that it deems conclusory
and never explicitly confront the question of whether discovery would likely
yield evidentiary support. Nor does this inquiry simply replicate the plausibility
analysis, because the reasonableness of inferring X is different from the
reasonableness of finding evidence to support X—as criminal procedure’s
distinction between sufficiency of the evidence to convict and probable cause to
63
search demonstrates.
If the court reaches the question whether discovery is likely to produce
evidence supporting an allegation, it must consider the parties’ access to the
evidence without discovery. If a party has access to the evidence without
discovery, but has not come up with it, it is less likely that discovery will
produce that evidence than if the party did not have access to it without
discovery. It is easier for a judge in the first situation than in the second to say,
“If you haven’t come up with it yet, I don’t think discovery will help.”
V
CONCLUSION
I think that Twombly and Iqbal are here to stay, and that there are a variety
of ways in which they can be tamed. I am largely encouraged that courts tend to
be confining the label “conclusory” to allegations that are equivalent to the
elements of a right of action, and inquiring whether that conclusion can
reasonably be inferred from the factual allegations of the complaint, rather than
broadly inquiring into the believability of each allegation. I have some worries
about Matrixx, but think they are manageable as well. I would urge the bar to
give up on “information and belief” and follow the instructions of Rule
11(b)(3), thereby focusing attention on the need for discovery and the
discretion that district courts have to allow it, even pending a motion to dismiss.
I would also urge the bar to be on the lookout for ways to provide information
that could change a judge’s baseline assumptions about the way the world
usually works and therefore alter his view of the plausibility of an inference.
I certainly do not claim that courts are uniformly acting in accord with these
suggestions. My point is far more modest: These methods of taming Twombly
and Iqbal remain viable, and therefore lawyers and judges should consider
them. Finally, I would urge you to also consider whether my proposed
amendment to Rule 12(b) meets the needs of the bar and the clients they
represent.
63. See Hartnett, Taming Twombly, supra note 3, at 506–07.

